Sunday, March 18, 2018

That One is Gonna Leave a Mark


It gets no worse. (Chuck Burton/Associated Press)

THE LOSE finds himself pressed into service here during a weekend getaway to the Central California coast. I would be remiss were I not to comment on what is, without a doubt, one of the greatest acts of Lose in the history of Lose, an act of Lose which will transcend time and stand forever.

On Friday night in Charlotte, N.C., we witnessed a first in the NCAA tournament, when #16 seed UMBC defeated #1 Virginia 74:54. This marks the first time in the tournament’s history that a #16 defeated a #1 seed. Prior to this game, 16-seeds were 0-135 against 1-seeds. There had been some near misses over the years – one game that went to OT and a couple of 1-point games, the most famous of which being Georgetown v. Princeton back in 1989 – and it was one of those scenarios that you can sort of intellectualize actually happening one day and yet, the more you think about it, seems completely nuts. In order for a 16-seed to beat a 1-seed, you’d think there’d have to be some bizarre circumstances at play. In the case of Princeton v. Georgetown in 1989, it was a case where the NCAA Selection Committee got it all completely wrong: Princeton were a way better team than anyone realized. In the one instance where a 16-seed beat a 1-seed in the NCAA women’s tournament – Harvard beating Stanford back in 1998 – #1 seed Stanford earned the top spot for their body of work over the course of the season, but I remember Stanford showed up to the tourney completely ravaged by injuries. It didn’t take away from Harvard’s achievement, mind you – you dance with who you brung, as injuries are a part of the game – but the point is that you’d think, for a 16 to beat a 1, you’d need these sort of confluences of events to occur.

But that really wasn’t the case in Charlotte. Sure, the Virginia Cavaliers were missing De’Andre Hunter, who broke his wrist right before the tournament, but one player shouldn’t have made that much of a difference. This wasn’t a case where the wonderfully named Retrievers of UMBC rode their luck and eked out a win. This was a 20-point domination. Virginia was the top defensive team in the country this season, allowing only 53 points a game, and the Wahoos hadn’t allowed a team to break 70 all season. UMBC scored 53 points in the second half. The Retrievers point guard Jairus Lyles cut the Virginia defense to ribbons in the second half. Whatever script you may have conceived on in your mind for how a 16-seed might beat a 1-seed, this certainly wasn’t it. 

Wait, we did WHAT? (Gerry Broome, Associated Press)

And it’s ironic that this fate has befallen Virginia, of course, as the Cavaliers were previously on the end of what’s considered to be the greatest upset in the history of the sport: a Hawaiian holiday gone horribly wrong back in 1982. The then #1 Cavs, led by the original unicorn – 7’4” Ralph Sampson – somehow lost 77:72 to Chaminade, who were an NAIA school at the time. But this loss to UMBC on Friday in Charlotte, as a #1 seed in the South Regional, instantly vaults to the top of the list of the most shocking losses in the history of the sport. It is unprecedented and historic. It has rendered the rest of the tournament somewhat moot – really, who cares who wins the tournament, at this point? Whomever wins the tourney will have earned it, of course, but what will ultimately be memorable about the 2018 tournament is the fact that a #16 seed beat a #1 seed for the first time ever. Whatever results were to follow from here for UMBC – not many, as it turned out, as they shot 29.8% in their 2nd round loss to Kansas State – or for any other team at all, are irrelevant. UMBC are the big winners here, heroes for the little guys from now on for as long as they play the game. They have managed to make themselves immortal, while Virginia has made themselves infamous.

Vegas had UMBC going off as a 20½-point underdog at the start this game, and with good reason: Virginia was the #1 overall seed in the tournament, a team which had had lost one game in ACC play, in overtime, and won the supposedly best conference in the country by four games. The Retrievers, meanwhile, fit the profile similar to many of the 16s over time, in that it’s a team that didn’t win their league – the America East, one of the weakest in the country – but got it going in the conference tournament. UMBC contrived to somehow lose by 44 points to the Great Danes of SUNY Albany during the season – a loss which, in retrospect, seems absolutely confounding – and just to get to the NCAA tournament, they had to win the title game on the road at Vermont, who’d beaten UMBC 23 straight times. While being better than most 16-seeds historically, the Retrievers weren’t that much better. 

But there was UMBC, on Friday night, running circles around the top-ranked team in the country. What in the hell is this? What am I watching? Can this be real? 

I should point out, at this point, that I have some connections to this game, which make this result a bit more personal than it may have otherwise. I mean, as cool as it would have been to see Penn beat Kansas, I wouldn’t have had much to go on when writing a blog about it. I didn’t even enter any NCAA betting pools this year, and had I done so, UMBC would probably stand for University of My Bracket is Crap right about now. But no, in fact, UMBC stands for the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, and the greater Baltimore metropolitan area happens to be the home of The Official Spouse of In Play Lose, so she actually knows about the school – it is apparently an outstanding science and technology institute whose greatest competitive pursuit in the past has been chess – although the conversation in the household went something like this:

Spouse: “UMBC has a basketball team?”
Me: “UMBC actually exists?”

Some more familial intrigue stemmed from the fact that The Official Mother-in-Law of In Play Lose is, in fact, an alumnus of the University of Virginia. She actually said on the phone the other day, “I’m excited for the tournament this year, because Virginia is really good.” Uh, so, yeah, there probably isn’t quite as much enthusiasm for the tournament anymore in the household. And, of course, I cannot help but point out that before he was the head coach at the University of Virginia, Tony Bennett was the head coach at my beloved Washington State, a university where losing is such an art form that they coined a verb for it, a school where the history of failure is so abject that I’ve retired their number and declared them ineligible for Lose of the Year. If/when I open The Hall of Lose in (city to be determined, we’ll have that discussion another time), Washington State will be first-ballot inductees. If there was ever going to be a guy who’d blow a 1-16 matchup in the NCAA tourney, it would be a guy with a connection to W.S.U. And the more that I’ve been thinking about this implausible loss by the Wahoos, the more that I think that W.S.U. connection needs to be explored and explicated.

I was wrong before when I said that I’d have nothing to say if Penn had beaten Kansas a 1-16 matchup this past week. This is because back in 1980, when the tourney expanded to 48 teams, Penn were a 12-seed – i.e., one of the four worst teams in the field – and it was during that tourney, in a Mideast Region game in West Lafayette, Indiana, that Penn began the longstanding NCAA tradition of 12-seeds beating 5-seeds by beating … Washington State. A 5-seed losing to a 12-seed in a field of 64 isn’t nearly as damning as losing to one of the four worst teams in the field! (I’ve heard all sorts of stories and rumors about how it came to be that W.S.U. lost this game, but I don’t feel like I’m at liberty to reveal them. I’ll just leave those to your imagination.) W.S.U.’s other most notable accomplishments in their few forays into the NCAA tournament include setting a record for the worst FG% in an NCAA Final against Wisconsin in 1941 – a mark which stood for 70 years before the Butler brickfest against UConn in 2011 – and a horrible, inexplicable loss to Boston College in 1994 which marked the end of the Kelvin Sampson era at W.S.U. (Sampson is now the head coach at Houston, who suffered this crushing defeat against Michigan on Saturday.) 

And I’ve always kept an eye on Tony Bennett’s progress at Virginia, simply because he took Washington State to heights it’s scarcely seen. The Cougars won 26 games and were a #3 seed in the tourney in 2007, lost a thrilling double OT game to Vanderbilt in the second round, and Bennett was the AP Coach of the Year. In 2008, they reached the Sweet 16 and exited against North Carolina with the run-of-the-mill sort of failure typical in the NCAA tourney – i.e., they couldn’t make a shot. Tony had taken over the program from his father, Dick Bennett, who was originally coaxed out of retirement in 2003 to take over the W.S.U. program when the university was absolutely desperate for a decent basketball program. The program disintegrated post-Sampson, and in the four years prior to the Bennett family’s arrival in Pullman, the Cougars had gone 9-63 in Pac-10 play. They were that bad.

Dick Bennett made a name for himself coaching his way up through the University of Wisconsin system, first at Green Bay and then in Madison. His crowning achievement was taking the Badgers to the Final Four in 2000 – where they lost to Michigan State 54:41 in a game that was so horrible and so unsightly that the NCAA started changing the rules in response to it. Dick Bennett’s approach to basketball involved three things: defense, defense, and defense. His teams were physical, ruthless, and went about defensively suffocating the opposition. The offense scheme seemed to consist mainly of holding the ball for most of the shot clock, throwing the ball in the general direction of the basket, crashing the glass and maybe getting an offensive rebound. It was sort of a mess, to be honest. It was unsightly, at best, and revolting, at worst. Seeing his Wisconsin team in the Final Four, throwing bricks and engaging in a 40-minute wrestling match with Sparty, made much of the basketball viewing public feel unclean.

But I was down with Dick Bennett taking over the W.S.U. program, because his arrival gave them an immediate presence and identity. The Cougars were going to be tenacious, they were going to fight you, they were going to be a complete pain in the ass. They were no longer some irrelevant team like Oregon State who you’d think nothing of on your Pac-10 schedule. You’d see W.S.U. there and think, “yikes, that game is gonna be a rock fight. That game is gonna be a complete nuisance.” There was something really cool about Dick Bennett’s three Cougar teams in that it ran contrary to everything you thought you knew, and liked, about the game of basketball. It seemed reactionary, almost revolutionary. You had to adjust your ideas about what the game was, but in this context, W.S.U. basketball had become strangely fun.

They didn’t win as much as anyone would’ve liked – they were young and inexperienced teams that just couldn’t make enough shots – but even so, during that time they beat Arizona for the first time in 20 years, and beat UCLA at Pauley Pavilion in L.A. for the first time ever, yes, ever. It was odd when Dick Bennett retired once again, saying that he wished they’d won more games and earnestly feeling like he’d disappointed people at W.S.U., when in truth, he’d done anything but.

And he left the program in the hands of Tony who, unlike his Dad, actually seemed to like offense. Tony was an NBA player who’d been one of the best 3-point shooters in college basketball back when he was at UWGB. The evolving of the Bennett family system involved adding intelligent offensive play to compliment the intense defense. One of the things which people constantly fail to realize is that in basketball, you can actually play defense with offense. In fact, the most devastating and demoralizing defensive act in the game is to hold the ball for the duration of the shot clock, thus making the opposition work hard, and then score anyway. The entire premise of those Princeton offenses which we mentioned earlier was that they would hold the ball forever and then ultimately get a highly-efficient shot – be it an open 3-point shot or a lay-up through a back door cut. This notion of high-efficiency shots is a concept that’s now en vogue in the NBA but wasn’t fully intellectualized in the 1980s or 1990s or into the 2000s. Tony Bennett’s W.S.U. teams not only could squeeze the life out of you defensively, but they also had guys that could shoot the three and create off the dribble and score in the low block after having killed off the shot clock, which made them even harder to beat than before. 

And having guys with those skills also means that, if necessary, you could also speed up the game. Back when I was first watching college basketball, in the 1970s and the 1980s, the most dominant program in the Pac-10 was the now-generally irrelevant Oregon State. Oregon State was absolutely infuriating because they would basically go into a stall with 10 minutes left in every game (remember, this was before the shot clock) and bore you to death, much as Dean Smith used to go Four Corners at the end of North Carolina games. What was so annoying about this was the fact that they didn’t have to do that to win. North Carolina and Oregon State had NBA players and could beat you 100:98 if they had to. If you got a big lead against them, they could speed up the game. Tony Bennett’s teams at Washington State had the same sort of vibe about them. They had the guys to play up-tempo if needed, play catch-up if needed. They could start fast and get the lead and then go about turning the game into an act of Chinese water torture.

And by ‘guys’ who can do that, I mean guys like Klay Thompson and Aron Baynes, both of whom are now NBA players and neither of whom were particularly highly recruited when they wound up at W.S.U. Since moving onto Charlottesville, Bennett’s program has produced NBA guys such as Malcolm Brogdon, who was the Rookie of the Year last season in Milwaukee and whose greatest attribute – the fact that he seems to know what he’s doing – runs counter to so many of the enormous-upside, athletic types NBA GMs seem to drool over, many of whom get onto the court and have no idea whatsoever what they are doing. Moving to Virginia and ACC country has availed Tony Bennett far more recruiting opportunities than being in Pullman, Washington, ever could have, but the type of player he looks for to fit his system – a smart guy, a hard-working guy willing to learn and work his ass off and develop in a multi-faceted way – has never really changed. Nor has his commitment to his father’s defensive principles. Tony Bennett’s Virginia Cavaliers of 2018 have evolved to become a more sophisticated version of the rock-fighting, subversive revolutionaries of Dick Bennett’s days.

But as they say, revolutionaries don’t make good rulers. And while I’ve just spent considerable airtime praising Tony Bennett just now, the fact of the matter is this: if a Tony Bennett team is considered to be the best team in college basketball, then college basketball is in really, really bad shape. Virginia’s program may have been garbage when Bennett arrived in 2009, but it does, in fact, have some tradition – i.e., the Ralph Sampson era of the 1980s – where W.S.U. had none. And in rising to the top of the ACC, that which was originally revolutionary about the Bennett style game ceased to exist. They’ve gone from scrappy outsiders to blue-bloods.

And ultimately, being a blue-blood in college sports is based upon a simple premise, which is that your talent is better than the other team’s talent. The greatest example of this is in college football, with Alabama winning all of the time. Alabama’s success on the gridiron is predicated on the idea that their defense is going to play like an NFL defense – and not a terribly complex one – and the other team won’t have good enough players to make difficult plays. It’s why they got into trouble in both of those Championship games against Clemson: the Tide did what do what they usually do, knocking receivers off routes and grabbing them every play and daring the refs to call it, which they never do, but Clemson had an NFL QB in DeShaun Watson who could throw to the back shoulder and into tight windows and make all the throws, and had receivers who could adjust and make the catches. Clemson had the talent to match Alabama, just as Ohio State did a few years ago as well. So many big-time college coaches ultimately fail in the pros because they have to actually scheme for a situation where every team has talent. Having better talent isn’t enough.

But the notion of “better” can be somewhat complex, however, and in the case of Virginia’s college basketball team, “better” does not necessarily mean more athleticism, because Virginia are used to playing teams with more athleticism than they have. What it does mean, however, is that the other side is going to have to be smart enough to figure out how to beat them – which is a tall order, since the game of college basketball at present is, fundamentally, such a low IQ endeavor. College basketball has suffered for years from a decided lack of imagination. Teams have become easy to guard and easy to defend. I’ve believed for years that the best way to make college basketball a better game would be to fire all of the coaches, since at the biggest programs, all of them have become intellectually lazy over time, finding it far too much effort to actually teach a kid how to shoot and far easier to preach the bullshit notions of toughness and effort on the defensive side of the ball. It’s far easier coaching defense than offense, after all. And since virtually no one has been bothering to actually preach and teach anything other than defensive effort, the cumulative effect on the game has been to turn it into a claustrophobic slog.

No one turns the game into a claustrophobic slog quite like Virginia does, and your typical sort of bland half-court set is going to play into Virginia’s hands. Your basic bland set in college basketball involves wasting 20 seconds of the shot clock running some sort of pattern your head coach has drilled into your heads which doesn’t go anywhere or accomplish anything, after which you go into a state of panic for the last 10 seconds of the clock and trying to somehow gin up a good shot. And you see this sort of behaviour from pretty much every team in college basketball. At a Duke or a Kentucky, you might have a guy with enough talent that they can then make something up and score a bucket, but Virginia’s entire game plan is based upon that an opposing offense is going to waste time and then run a fairly predictable set which they’ll be more than capable of defending as they pack in their defense tightly.

And what did UMBC do against Virginia? They sped up Virginia. They spread the floor, they created space, their point guard attacked the rim and kicked it to open shooters behind the 3-point line. So, in essence, they did exactly what every single NBA team does every single night. And see, that a #16 seed can come out and beat up the #1 seed in the tournament playing a style of game which seems so natural to NBA fans, yet completely foreign to the college game, speaks to the collective stupidity which has befallen college basketball. With the embracing of mathematics and analytics, the NBA has become one of the smartest games on the planet, while college teams continue to dumbly waste shot clock time (dumb because it allows the defense to get set) and then uselessly try to force feed the post. It’s no wonder the NBA has reached a point where they are not interested in drafting college seniors. Having spent four years in college, they’ve not learned anything. 

And neither have most of the coaches, for that matter: 


That’s a quote from 2016 from Marshall head coach Dan D’Antoni, whose team won a first round game this year in an upset. His brother, Mike D’Antoni, coaches the Houston Rockets, the smartest and, at present, the best team in the NBA. Mike also was the head coach of the “Seven Seconds or Less” Phoenix Suns, a team whose “Seven Seconds or Less” nickname, and most of their concepts of how to play the game, had originated in the days of Paul Westhead’s Loyola Marymount in the late 1980s – the phrase “seven seconds or less” referring to the fact that L.M.U. actually practiced with a 7-second shot clock in order to get used to playing at such a preposterous pace.

The point being, in bringing up stuff like Loyola Marymount and Princeton from the late 1980s, is that in order to compete against superior talent, one of the preferred ways to go about doing it was simply to think about the game differently, a notion which seems to have gone out the window over the years. UMBC were smarter than Virginia on Friday night in Charlotte. They knew how to attack, they stuck to a game plan and they were fundamentally smarter in their approach.

Which, ultimately, is how the little guys are going to beat the big guys in the game of college basketball. Oh, sure, you might have one guy on your team with elite level talent who goes crazy and leads you to an upset, à la C.J. McCollum of Lehigh vs. Duke, but most likely, you’re going to win by thinking your way through games and, more to the point, when you’re the smarter team, you don’t need to be the more athletic team. In this day and age, what you really need is a point guard who can drive and kick and some guys who can spot up and shoot. It amazes me that more lesser schools don’t play the same way UMBC played on Friday night.

UMBC didn’t play on Friday like they had “nothing to lose.” They’d played to win, and there’s a big difference between the two. And once they got down, Virginia just completely panicked and capitulated, continuing a disturbing trend of NCAA meltdowns which have plagued them since Bennett took over. They know how to play one way, and one way only, and when it starts going bad for them, they completely come apart at the seams. 

This certainly wasn’t the kind of history Virginia was hoping to make this season. Bennett is a class guy, and he did his best to handle this with grace, but the fact of the matter is that Virginia just suffered arguably the most embarrassing loss in the history of the sport, getting completely trucked by a 16-seed. I’m not sure how you come back from that. You can say it will “provide motivation” for next season, will add “fuel to the fire” and whatnot. That’s horseshit. This is the sort of loss you wind up having nightmares about. You almost have to start over, given the psychological wreckage. In time, you hope the Virginia players can come see the bigger picture here, realize that they were a part of history, and maybe even have a good laugh over it. But in the meantime, yikes. That one is gonna leave a mark.

Wednesday, February 28, 2018

Tankamania

Whee! We’re going to the lottery!

THESE final six weeks of the NBA season should be rife with good storylines. In both the East and the West, there are tight, 2-team battles to see who will finish with the best overall record and secure home court advantage throughout the playoffs. Both the East and the West also have insanely competitive playoff races shaping up, with teams Nos. 3-8 bunched up close together in the standings, and a few teams on the fringe knocking on the door. A bad week and your team could go from possibly hosting a 1st round playoff series to being out of the playoffs entirely. Complicating matters for the playoff contenders is the fact that many of them have been severely impacted by the rash of serious injuries to stars and key players which has run rampant through the NBA this season – an unfortunate and rather shitty development, since far too many of the best players in the world are sitting on the sidelines in suits, but also something of an intriguing one, because teams have had to figure out on the fly how to win games, often deviating wildly from their usual styles of play. Two teams – New Orleans and Washington – actually seem to be thriving in their times of adversity, having completely reconfigured how they’re going about playing in the absence of Boogie Cousins and John Wall, respectively. With all of these playoff races so right, with every game mattering down the stretch, it should make for some wonderful, competitive basketball.

But all of that threatens to be undermined by the shenanigans going on at the bottom of the standings, where all of the bad teams are in a full-on race to the bottom in hopes of having the best odds in this year’s draft lottery. It’s a perfect storm of awfulness: cynical business practices, perverse incentives, incompetence and just flat-out horrible basketball. Welcome to Tankamania 2018!

Official vehicle of the NBA

In general, The Lose is not impressed by tanking. Losing is the default, and you have to do everything within your power to avoid it. The whole point of any competitive endeavor is to try to actually succeed at it. 

In the NBA, however, they don’t necessarily share that view. The common wisdom in the NBA is that the only way you can win is if you have star players, the best way to acquire star players is through the draft, and the best way within the draft to acquire star-level talent is to pick towards the top. As such, you’re better off being truly terrible, and having a shot at the top picks, than you are by being run-of-the-mill bad. Drafts always create this sort of perverse incentive to begin with, but in response to the Houston Rockets repeatedly dogging it in the early 1980s in order to draft Ralph Sampson and then Hakeem Olajuwon in successive years, the NBA created a lottery to allocate draft slots. This was intended to dissuade teams from tanking, but has instead had the inverse effect. In the original lottery, among the seven teams who missed the playoffs, each had a 1/7 chance in landing the top spot. It doesn’t take a genius to find the flaw in this system – if you’re a middling team battling for the last playoff spot, you had a 14.3% chance of winning the lottery and basically a 0% chance of winning a first-round playoff series. So obviously, in the interest of the long-term, you’re better off slipping out of the playoffs and into the lottery. 

The NBA then changed the bell curve after some near-miss playoff teams wound up with high picks, since ultimately the whole point of a draft is to create competitive balance by giving the worst teams a chance to improve. But changing the curve still doesn’t dissuade a team from giving up on the season and hoping to strike it rich. Instead of there being disincentive to tank, there is actually more. The low percentage play – having a 1% chance of winning the lottery and striking it rich, which has now happened multiple times – is still better than the no-percentage play – being an 8 seed and getting stepped on by Golden State.

So teams are dogging it at this point of every season, trying to game the system in the hopes that the magic ping pong ball will bounce their way. It’s reached a point of complete absurdity in recent years, what with Sam Hinkie and Fuck the Trust the Process in Philadelphia basically throwing away three whole seasons, along with the complete travesty of last season when the Lakers and Suns were  shutting down healthy players for the last two months of the year because they were winning too often with those guys on the floor. As a result, the NBA has announced they are going to yet again smooth out the curve starting in 2019 in an effort to further dissuade tankers. I suspect this won’t have near the effect the league is hoping for – the 11th and 12th worst teams still won’t have ample incentive to try and make the playoffs – but given that the odds are going to change, and truly awful teams won’t have quite as many bites at the apple starting in 2019, 2018 is the last best chance to reap the most benefit from being truly terrible.

Combine this with the fact that so many teams are hamstrung thanks to the summer of 2016, when a spike in the salary cap meant enormous sums of money in the system which bad teams handed out in the form of bad contracts to mediocre players, and the fact that the Warriors basically broke the goddamn league – being so good, and so young, that many teams simply realized they aren’t going to compete in the near future. Not only has there never been a better time in the NBA to be bad, but a whole lot of teams are, at this point, actually willing to be terrible. And I mean terrible. I’m hard pressed to think of a time when the NBA, or any other league in North America, has had as many truly terrible teams as there are right now. 

But I’m not actually sure how you truly disincentivize losing. I used to think that the problem was that, in these North American leagues with set number of franchises, there is no incentive to win whereas in, say, European soccer leagues, being terrible winds up seeing you relegated and sent to the depths that are the second division. The thing is though, is that if you look at, say, the EPL, you see far more bad teams than you see in any American sports venture. 13 of the 20 teams in the EPL have sub-.500 records. The 7th place team, Burnley, has held onto that position in spite of not winning a game since early December. In a league like the EPL, there is zero incentive to actually be good and the only incentive is to be just good enough to avoid the axe at the end of the season. And who cares about cup competitions? It’s a waste of resources to put your best guys out there for those and risk having them injured, when the only thing that actually matters is not getting relegated. It you finish 17th, and keep those £200 million of TV revenue coming in, it’s as good as if you finished 7th.

Sports all over the globe have now been infected with the belief that making efforts to win are foolish. Like I say, this seems to run counter to the whole bloody point of the endeavor. Basketball is the easiest game in which to tank, simply because it has the fewest moving parts. The more players you have on a team, the more chances to undermine your attempt at failing by actually doing something good or even brilliant. While the NBA isn’t alone in this phenomenon by any means,  given the ramifications of the jerryrigged salary cap that’s part of the leagues Collective Bargaining Agreement, it’s definitely the strangest. Teams will routinely trade players they might want to keep for players they would never want to keep, sign players to contracts they know are bad in the hopes of one day trading those players for something else which might be good, and generally resort to a whole series of measures designed to make themselves worse in the present as they go about chasing the rainbow that is the NBA lottery in hopes of striking the pot o’gold – that #1 overall pick.

So due to circumstances, we have a group of NBA teams this year all clamoring like hell to be as bad as possible. And I should be clear about something here – tanking is entirely a management-driven endeavor. Players don’t play to lose. They HATE losing. They have something to play for at all times. They play for their next contract, they play in hopes of getting more minutes or getting bigger roles. Players are not trying to tank. The idea of continuing to be terrible, in the hopes of being good down the road, is entirely a management construct – which is precisely why you should immediately be skeptical of any team that goes about tanking, because management, ultimately, wants your money but does not necessarily care about the best interests of the fans. When it comes to sports, The Lose is a pure Marxist, believing that if I’m going to pony up $150 to watch a Warriors game, I ain’t going to see Joe Lacob. I’m going to see Steph and Klay and Dray and KD. I want to see great players do great things. I fundamentally consider tanking to be an act of bad faith, and I don’t want to see some extenuation of a math problem constructed by management out there on the floor. Players play to win, but when it comes to tanking, management does what it can to put those players in a position to fail.

The Lose doesn’t appreciate teams that deliberately go about losing, but as a curator of all things done badly, a tank race like we have this year in the NBA is truly remarkable and impossible to ignore. Given that about 20 teams are still vying for good playoff positions, there promises to be some truly great basketball in the next few weeks, but given that there are also eight godfuckingterrible teams in the NBA engaging in a mad scramble towards the bottom, there is also going to be some of the worst basketball that the NBA has ever seen.

Oh, no, wait, we’d better make it nine teams, because here come the Knicks!

Hey guys! Wait for us!

But the Knicks missed out on the opportunity. They won too many games back before Kristaps Porziņģis tore his ACL. Without Porziņģis in the line-up, there is zero incentive for the Knicks to try to win any games, but the Knicks were on the fringes of playoff contention earlier this season – a fun-bad team that was overachieving, thus bringing irrational optimism to the Knicks faithful at Madison Square Garden – and now they’re just bad. They’re bad but they are also too good. They’ve won too many games already, although they’ll sure as hell try to blow the rest of them if need be.

And talking about Tankamania is completely unavoidable, because you have almost a third of the league trying to do it. Recently, Mark Cuban – the only owner in the NBA who will say what everyone else is thinking – got fined $650,000 by the league for out-and-out-saying, on a podcast, that the Dallas Mavericks are setting themselves up to fail. (Amazingly, being fined $650,000 was only the second-worst thing that happened to the Dallas Mavericks last week.) This was followed up with some harsh words in a memo from NBA commissioner Adam Silver. Harsh words, but ultimately empty words, because this is the order of business in the league right now. What, exactly, would the NBA do if they were somehow to try to punish a tanking team? Revoke their draft pick? Ban them from the lottery? I mean, I guess you could theoretically do that, but you’d have to do it to everybody, at this point. Some teams are more opaque about it, of course, but all you have to do is look at the current standings to see that everyone at the bottom is trying to lose games:

All of these teams are terrible

Woof.

And we should point out here that there is a faux tanker in our midsts, a wolf in sheep’s clothing – albeit a toothless, scrawny wolf that would get ganged up on and pulverized by the flock. That would be Brooklyn, who don’t actually have their draft pick this summer:



Brooklyn are still paying the price for the worst trade in NBA history, and Cleveland now owns that pick after acquiring it from Boston in the Kyrie Irving trade this past summer  – and the Cavs’ decision not to peddle that pick in some hasty win-now trade looks better and better with every Nets loss. Absent their pick, Brooklyn has no incentive to lose. They really are just that bad. Although if you saw this opening salvo from the Swamp Dragons game against Chicago earlier this week, you might have thought they were actively trying to fail:

Words fail.

The Bulls, meanwhile, were out front of the Tankamania race right from the start, as they started the season 3-20:

Whee! Look at us! We suck!


But a confluence of events, owing entirely to some actual good players, have threatened to derail the Bulls’ quest for tanking glory. It turns out that the three guys who wound up in red-and-black after the Jimmy Butler trade – Kris Dunn, Zach LaVine, and 2017 first-round pick Lauri Markkanen – are actually not bad. Add in Nikola Mirotić, who returned mid-season after teammate Bobby Portis broke his face in a fight at practice, and all of a sudden the Bulls had a competent line-up and started winning games. A lot of games, in fact. Gasp!   

Now, of course, there is some upside for the beleaguered Bulls front office to having a young core coalesce and win some games, in that it makes it look like they know what they are doing after several years of incompetent decision-making, so it buys some time and buys a little cred for GarPax and for coach Fred Hoiberg, but even so, the Bulls actually playing well put the tank job in severe jeopardy. So the Bulls quickly made one of those classic NBA trades where you dump a guy who is good for someone you wholly know is bad – jettisoning Mirotić to New Orleans for the corpse that is Omer Asik – and have now taken to doing stuff like scratching healthy players, keeping previously injured players out longer than need be, and going so far as to tell Markkanen 36 hours before a game in Sacramento not to bother trying to reschedule when his original flight from Chicago got cancelled. The Bulls are desperate to make up that 2½ game gap, but no one below them in the standings seems particularly inclined to let them, because doing so would require actual efforts to win games.

So the Bulls ran out to a huge lead in the Tankamania race. “Hold my beer,” said the Orlando Magic:






The Magic came to the Bay Area back in November, when they were 8-5, and I was impressed with what I saw of them at the time. Well-coached, good scheme, clear in their objectives. The Magic acquitted themselves well that night in a 110:100 loss to Golden State. 

But notice how, at no point in that last paragraph, did I mention anything about the talent on the roster – because there isn’t any. The Magic got off to that good start by shooting unsustainably well, and once that predictably tailed off, and the schemes were sussed out, the losses started to mount, and they’ve been both unwilling and incapable of stopping the slide. After an 8-5 start, the Magic are 10-37 since. The Magic haven’t made the playoffs since 2012, are 142-315 during that stretch, and have contrived to have not a single viable player on their roster in spite of drafting in the lottery for five straight years. Oh, I suppose Aaron Gordon has some upside, but it’s not clear the Magic want to pay him $20 million a year going forward. No one in Orlando had any expectations of this team being any good to begin with, given the mismatched roster, but the Magic have managed to underachieve even still.

The Magic are used to being this bad by now, whereas the Bulls are still working on it, so when the two teams met recently in Chicago, the Magic showed the right way to throw away a game, blowing a huge 2nd half lead and then doing something idiotic in crunch time:


See, that right there is a classic tanking loss. A good, close game where you then put the ball in the hands of someone incompetent – in this case, Bismack Biyombo – and trust them to screw up the game for you. You can almost hear the cynical Chicago Bulls group of fans shouting out “NOOOOO!” as LaVine is going in for this game-winning dunk, seeing their chances for landing the #1 pick getting worse right before their very eyes.

Four months of truly terrible play, interspersed with come-from-ahead losses such as this one against the Bulls, have allowed the Orlando Magic to catch up, and then pass, the Bulls in the great 2018 Tankamania derby, and also catch up to the third Eastern conference tank commander, the Atlanta Hawks. The Hawks are sort of the quintessential mediocre franchise – they have actually been to the playoffs 11 straight years, but have achieved so little ultimately that you don’t even realize it. New Hawks GM Travis Schlenk has traded in for a new model:



This is of great disappointment to a lot of the hipster NBA basketball media, who’d adopted the Hawks as their charming darlings for most of the past decade, and now have to find another team to dote their admiration upon as they go about achieving little in a unique, contrarian way. But enough about the Utah Jazz. Let’s go back to the Hawks … uh, no, I don’t want to talk about the Hawks, because they’ve verged on being unwatchable.

But at least the Hawks came into this season with a plan: push the reset button and start all over. And the Hawks have stuck to this plan. There can be some value to doing what Chicago did – acquiring bad salary in exchange for draft picks – but one of the problems with doing this is that you now have bad salary to deal with in the future. Wisely, Atlanta held firm and are just going to ride out a lousy season. This would give me some hope were I a fan of the Hawks. At least there seems to be some idea of what to do going forward.

This as opposed to Memphis, losers of 10 in a row and showing no real idea that they know that they’re doing. I sort of touched on the problems befalling Memphis in my Lose of the Year post for 2017, because Memphis is in a really bad spot right now and they don’t really know which way they are going:


Memphis are in a bad spot, in that they remember back to when Mike Conley and Marc Gasol were healthy earlier this season and they remember how they beat Golden State and beat Houston twice and think that all they need are these slow, old guys – who can still be quite good – and they will continue to be a good team. Not a great team, mind you, because those guys are over 30 and injury-prone and on the down sides of their careers, but good enough to remain relevant and maybe make the playoffs and keep the asses in seats. It’s this sort of thinking which, at the trade deadline, made them not trade their best asset, Tyreke Evans, who is having a helluva year but whom they aren’t well positioned to re-sign when his contract expires this summer. See, Conley will be back from the Achilles injury which caused him to miss 69 games, and Gasol will be here and they can re-sign Evans because no one has any money to spend, so then they can put the band back together and be competitive once again.  

But in the here and now, this team is horrible – but probably not horrible enough to lose enough games to have the worst record in the league, and thus the best odds in the draft. Griz culture is “Grit & Grind,” it’s all about playing hard and playing your ass off and fighting against adversity. The Griz emobdy that. They play hard, they just don’t play very well. This team has drafted atrociously, cobbled together a misfit lineup and instilled an “Us Against the World” mentality which they’ve been living off of for years in lieu of restocking the cupboards. I have no idea how GM Chris Wallace still has a job in Memphis, given that he’s not managed to draft a guy worth giving a second contract to for more than a decade, and given out a $92 million contract to Chandler Parsons, who is physically unable to play and still has two years left on one of the worst contracts in the NBA. You can fool yourself into thinking that everything is going to go right – Conley will be healthy again, and Parsons will be able to move, and Gasol won’t continue to age less than gracefully – but no one in Memphis has any idea what to do if that plan doesn’t work which, given the injury history of everyone that I just mentioned, seems quite likely to be the case.

Memphis doesn’t know where they are going, and, as we mentioned previously, neither does the Phoenix Suns:


Shout out to the Suns for coming fresh off the All-Star break, starting out with a home game against the Clippers, who’d played a close game at Golden State the night before, and promptly falling behind 35-8 in the first quarter. 

The Suns would be my go-to choice for ultimately landing the bottom spot, simply because they seem incapable of winning a game unless Devin Booker goes nuts and goes off for 40 points – and not even that worked the other night against the Pelicans. The Suns are so bad that playing badly doesn’t even make a difference – whereas someone like the battlin’ Memphis Grizzles are likely to win a few games simply by playing harder than their opponents, which is what they still go about doing, the Suns are repeatedly going supernova and losing by these preposterously large sums. This is because Phoenix’s roster is composed almost entirely of really bad draft picks and the relics of terrible trades, and no one in the organization wants to admit they made a mistake, which creates a definitely unnecessary sense of job security among those on the floor, while Memphis is composed of a bunch of fringe guys fighting for their future. Even their interim coach, J.B. Bickerstaff, has been overly combative, ranking among the leaders in technical fouls and going so far as to threaten to fight referee Marc Davis after getting thrown out of a game. (An understandable sentiment, if you’ve ever seen Davis officiate a game.) 

The other team that’s almost certainly going to play too hard and too smartly over the next six weeks are the aforementioned Dallas Mavericks, who are stumbling and skidding all over the place at the moment, both off the court and on it:





Dallas really should be better than their 19-42 record, simply because they’ve been in a lot of close games this season and managed to lose almost all of them. Mavs games have always been fascinating to watch simply to see what they do against the other team. Most teams just run their sets and run their stuff as the season goes along, but the Mavs have always game-planned heavily. Usually, you can get a good idea for what to do in the future against a team by watching how Dallas plans to go about attacking them.

But, of course, all of that preparation and planning by Head Coach Rick Carlisle may put you in position to win, but the Mavs then fall short because they don’t have enough talent on the roster to seal the deal – which is what’s happened again and again this season. And now that Cuban has as much as said that the Mavericks are tanking, reports have circulated that speak to the meticulous nature by which Dallas is going about doing it, using the same sorts of analytics and data which you would use to figure out what the best line-ups might be to go about trying to figure out which would be the worst. Suddenly, the Mavs are throwing out these weird line-ups in crunch time with guys who’ve scarcely played together and who’d seem to be a terrible fit in the interests of developing young players, and you can always throw rookie Dennis Smith Jr. out there to run the point, since he’s a rookie and will make all the sorts of awful mistakes that rookies are inclined to make, and justify blowing close games by saying that you’re letting your young players go through the growing pains.

Which is precisely what Sacramento have done for most of the season. The Kings have won 18 games this year almost entirely due to simply having a whole bunch of young guys who play harder than the opponents. They’re actually above .500 in close games for the season, which is why they have 18 wins instead of about 10. This game last week with OKC was sort of a classic example of Kings basketball. Having come back from a 20-point deficit, they then tie the game late through a combination of idiotic decision making and sheer tenacity:

But the Kings then remembered their prime objective, which is to lose games, and lost to OKC at the buzzer by basically not bothering to closely guard some guy named Russell Westrbook, who I’ve heard is kinda good. Classic tank loss right there. Play hard, play well, keep it close, and screw it up at the end.

And you could say “but wait, the Kings hustled their ass off to rally on that penultimate play, so how is tanking?” and the reason for that, of course, is that ultimately losing is losing, and with a team like Sacramento, you reach a point where it’s almost impossible to discern between them trying to lose and trying not to. In some ways, the Kings have been tanking for most of the past 67 years, a gold standard of poor play and even poorer decision making:


What’s instructive here is not to focus upon what’s taking place on the floor in the here and now for all of these teams – which amounts to little more than game film in need of being burned – but how exactly they all reached this place. In the case of Atlanta, Memphis, Chicago, and Dallas, being this bad is something of a consequence of riding out a core of veteran players for too long and not adjusting on the fly. All four of those teams have had sustained success, but those good runs came to an end, they were slow to adapt, and are now paying the price for that. In the case of Brooklyn, clearly they had a severe lack of judgment on the talent front when they made that awful trade with the Celtics and set themselves up for continued misery, but the Nets were at least trying to make a big splash at the time, and it backfired spectacularly. But you can at least appreciate the ambition, even if it was misguided.

But then you have the basket cases like the Suns and the Kings and Orlando, who constantly draft high and constantly misfire, make terrible trades, and who are plagued with terrible ownership and management. Given how Vivek Ranadivé has foolishly inserted himself into the draft process in the past, who is to say he won’t do it again if, somehow, the Kings wind up landing the first overall pick? Seriously, Sac fans, do you trust the President of the Sauce Castillo Fan Club to know what to do?




And see, tanking won’t have helped you at that point. It isn’t the end of your problems. The Pelicans have made the playoffs once in the Anthony Davis era, in spite of having had the good fortune of landing one of the game’s most potentially transcendent talents in the draft. Hell, the Timberwolves have consecutive first overall picks in their squad, and didn’t start winning until they imported Butler from the Bulls to tell both KAT and Wiggins where the hell they’re supposed to be on the floor. A budding star is only the starting point. You have to be smart enough to know what to do from there.

And as we’ve seen, time and again, finding star players can prove to be tricky, because stars often seem to come from nowhere. Butler, the undisputed alpha dog in Minnesota ahead of the young #1s, was the 30th pick in the draft. Steph Curry went #7, Klay Thompson #11, Giannis #15, Kawhi Leonard #16. It’s very strange to me when I point these sorts of things out to tanking advocates, who then say, “oh, but they’re exceptions to the rule.” Well, guess what? Everyone who is a star in the NBA is, by definition, an exception to the rule! Some guy you draft with the first overall pick is going to turn out to be a star is also, as it turns out, an exception to the rule. I’ll point this out once more: in the history of the NBA draft lottery, a total of four, yes, four guys taken first overall won an NBA title with the team that drafted them: David Robinson and Tim Duncan in San Antonio, LeBron and Kyrie Irving in Cleveland. That’s it. It’s been shown statistically that guys picked 10th are more likely to turn out to be NBA all-stars then guys picked 2nd, which is most likely due to the fact that the teams picking second are likely to be run by dodo birds. This is all inexact science here, and it’s a process fraught with the perils of guys getting hurt and maybe getting stuck in bad situations. And sure, picking towards the top gives you wider latitude – the hope being that you find a guy good enough to overcome your organizational incompetence – but when you squander such opportunities, it simply becomes more galling over time.

Drafting high means hoping for the best in the future, but in the present, your team is garbage. I can laugh at what’s going on in the NBA right now, look at these nine tankers and struggle to find a dozen good players on their rosters that I’d actually want on my team, giggle at goofy gifs of bad plays and the like, but the fact of the matter is that this is A BAD PRODUCT that the NBA is putting out on the floor in a third of their markets – and also an expensive one. One of the things I’ve found to be true, when it comes to people who advocate tanking, particularly in the media, is that it’s people who aren’t actually paying any money to go to the games. These are businesses, in the end, and businesses depend on customers, be they television eyes or asses in seats. This is not just a math problem. Were I living in Atlanta or Phoenix right now, why on earth would I want to bother to pony up to go to one game, much less an entire season’s worth of games? What is the point?

Remember, the reason that Sam Hinkie and Fuck the Trust the Process ultimately got in deep trouble with the NBA, and run out of Philadelphia, was that as much as a few diehard Hinkie fanatics want to trumpet what he was doing, far more 76ers fans stayed home and what should’ve been an élite cash cow of a franchise, in one of the biggest markets, had actually become a drain on the league’s revenue sharing system. Sometimes in a basketball business, decisions have to be made for non-basketball reasons. To Hinkie, it was all a math problem: let’s game the system and play all of the percentages and maybe we’ll wind up with a star. Okay, then what? How do you stay competitive if, through some miracle, you wind up with said star. Do you know how to find secondary and complimentary talent? Do you have the rapport with agents and players to coax others to join your team, or maybe take a haircut so as to free up some more money? Because at some point, you are no longer going to be handed talent by a lucky ping-pong ball. You have to find it in other ways, and I have no confidence in a teardown artist like Hinkie to be able to do that. His track record in Philadelphia – during which he amassed three centers, with the hopes of trading two of them some day, while not anticipating how useless the center position would become in the donut that the contemporary NBA has become – makes me leery of his supposed visionary qualities. Oh, sure, I get it, Hinkie never got the chance to see it through in Philly. But he was never going to get that chance, because there is only so much losing and pain that anyone is going to put up with.

But tanking has become hip and it’s all the rage in the NBA and also in Major League Baseball, owing to the fact that first the Astros, and the Cubs, appear to have tanked before rebuilding and winning World Series titles. That makes for the most convenient sort of excuse from clubs like the two Florida teams in MLB, who’ve all gone full-on sink-to-the-bottom this offseason, but it also masks the fact that both Houston and the Cubs were already bad to begin with, so tearing down wasn’t quite as hard at the start, and are enormously wealthy franchises located in enormous cities, and could thus to afford to withstand a full-on rebuild. Clowns like the Marlins and the Rays and the Pirates and the A’s can use Houston and Chicago’s successes as cover, when all they are really doing is simply shedding payroll and using revenue sharing funds to prop up their bottom lines. (Both Pittsburgh and the Marlins have been caught doing this before.) If it seems like a cynical ploy being put forth by franchise management, it more than likely is a cynical ploy, and should be treated as such.

And maybe 4-5 years from now, some of these kids at the top of this year’s NBA draft class will turn out to be stars, but in the here and now, the optics of having a third of your franchises trying to lose are really bad for the league. Any game between two of these dogs is going to an atrocious train wreck of an affair. Orlando has got a 6-game stretch that starts in late March against the Suns, Nets, Bulls, Hawks, Knicks, and Mavericks. Watching all six of those games may, in fact, cause people to go insane. And all of these dogs are also going to affect the actual playoff races. The Warriors, for instance, who are only a ½-game behind the Rockets for the best record in the NBA, still have three games with the Suns, two with the Kings, two with the Hawks, and a visit from the Swamp Dragons in their remaining 21 games. That’s basically 40% of the schedule remaining where the other team is most likely only going to barely try to compete, and more likely not even to have a pulse. Several of the tank commanders have a double-whammy remaining on their schedule where, over the course of three days, they play both Golden State and Houston, which will likely result in two losses by a total of about 65 points and a whole lot of wasted time for all involved.

I have no idea how the league deals with this, in the end. So long as there is a draft lottery, there is a reason to want to be a part of it. The NBA has sort of skirted the issue over the years, making the case that smoothing out the draft odds is, in fact, a way to punish the incompetent teams and encourage better management, instead of saying they’re trying to deter the tankers, and while I can see that you don’t want your commissioner coming out and saying teams aren’t trying, maybe the reason is that they know they simply can’t put a stop to it. It’ll be interesting if/when sports gambling is legalized across the country and the NBA is getting a piece of that action. The fear of legalized gambling has always been that games will wind up being fixed, but it’s already apparent that franchises are fixing them on their own as it is. They’re all gambling on the future and playing the lottery, but in the present, it doesn’t really seem any more like it’s much of a game.

And I have given this subject far too much ink, at this point, because I think tanking is incredibly lame and a disrespect to the game, but it certainly makes for content, and it is certainly amusing. In the moment, I can certainly enjoy seeing basketball played extremely badly, which is what is going to happen for the next few weeks. But I am still not watching any more Phoenix Suns games though. You could not pay me to watch that team. Even I have my limits.

Do you have any questions you’d like to ask? Would you like to commiserate because your team sucks? Drop me a line! You can email me atinplaylose@gmail.com, and when we get enough questions and comments gathered up, I’ll do another Hate Mail edition of In Play Lose.

Saturday, February 24, 2018

Our Hero



Go big, Lizzie, go big!


ONE of the principles that we abide by here at In Play Lose is that if it’s worth doing, it’s worth doing badly. And few people have taken that principle to loftier heights than Californian-turned-Venezuelan-turned Hungarian skeleton-rider-turned-freestyle skier Elizabeth Swaney, who put forth one of the lamest attempts in Olympic history when she went for a casual Sunday ski in the countryside down the halfpipe in PyeongChang. Swaney finished dead last, 24th of the 24 competitors entered, and then afterwards expressed her disappointment that she didn’t make the final (those who interviewed her weren’t sure whether or not she was being sincere), and then uttered some generic boilerplate text about how she aspired to be an inspiration to the Hungarian people – which, I suppose, could be true, in that the Hungarian people could see that it’s possible to do something really, really badly and yet somehow get attention for it.

Swaney was the latest in a long-line of Winter Olympic tourists, the most dubious of which are chronicled in this excellent piece published by The Ringer. The IOC is generally okay with obscure nations fielding sup-optimal athletes for events, and with good reason: the goal is to spread the gospel of the Olympic Games, and encourage participation across the globe. These athletes from weird, obscure nations may seem ridiculous, but over time, it’s possible to find true talent anywhere, and then eventually, you just might wind up finding someone from Surinam or Liechtenstein on the podium. (And it is an unstated goal of In Play Lose to somehow eventually mention every nation on earth within these posts. There, I’ve just named four more in two paragraphs. I can assure you this sort of behavior is nothing odd among journos. Someone at one of the weeklies I worked at ran a story with a Vaduz, Liechtenstein, dateline and I said to him, “you just ran this because you could get a Liechtenstein dateline in the issue” and he said, “well … yeah …”) 

I happen to agree with the idea, in principle, of attempting to expand the playing field, and I can understand completely that this will inevitably create some disparity in aptitude among those who are competing. That disparity becomes a bit more obvious in the Winter Olympics than in the summer, of course, for the simple reason that there are a lot of nations on this earth that don’t have any snow or ice. The Winter Olympics sports are almost all extremely technical in nature. Anyone can go out for a run. Not everyone can go out for a ski. 

And sometimes, the best way to encourage participation is for nations to go out and find willing participants, wherever they may be, which means finding some college kid from Seattle with Peruvian roots and suddenly declaring him to be a Peruvian. In order to field a team for the Winter Olympics, when you don’t have much snow or ice, the best way to go about doing that is to find someone from a place where there is snow or ice and give them a passport. The days of the iron-clad eligibility rules have long since passed in the Olympics – rules which were in place, mainly, because authoritarian nations wielded enormous power in the IOC and attempted to disincentivize their athletes defecting to the West in as many ways as possible. But nowadays, you can pretty much just hand someone a passport and say, “congratulations, you’re a Bulgarian” or what have you, and make up whatever justification you want. As time has passed, many of those shamateuristic Olympics ideals have faded, one of which being that somehow you need to continue to be tied to whatever nation you hailed from – a notion, which, historically, doesn’t hold any water as all, as the athletes from the original Greek games were perfectly happy to sell their services to whichever city-state ponied up the most. 

Nowadays, nations will just out-and-out buy a team, if need be. I’m actually surprised that it doesn’t happen more, in fact, given the inherent disproportion in talent you’re going to find from sport to sport. If one dominant power’s 10th best athlete in a sport – really good at what they do, but not quite good enough –  is better than anything you can put out there, let them come and be on your team, cultural connections be damned. You could field a good enough team of next-level Americans to finish 2nd to the Dream Team in the Olympics, for instance. Were the rules to permit it, I imagine Qatar would go about filling out a soccer team for 2022 World Cup by flying to Brazil and handing out fistsful of dollars along with passports. It wouldn’t be the first time they’ve done that. I went on a trip to L.A. with The Official Spouse of In Play Lose a few years ago, and we found ourselves housed in a hotel which was also playing host to a World Cup rhythmic gymnastics meet, of all things, and seemingly everyone involved seemed to be a Russian, no matter what the name of the country on the back of their tracksuits. The eligibility rules vary by sport, of course, with some more strident than others, but if the rules say you can buy a team, then go out and buy one!

But Elizabeth Swaney, our Hungarian freestyle skier here, didn’t need to be bought and, indeed, never could be because she doesn’t actually know how to do the event. One of the oddities about this case is the fact that the officials at the Hungarian Skiing Federation have admitted that they never actually saw her ski before, which speaks to a curious lack of oversight. Many of these Olympic tourists are one-off novelty acts who serve as something of a side show and comic relief: there is some African cross-country skier who looks as if they’ve never seen snow, or some Caribbean luger or whatnot, and they provide a certain amount of levity to what is a tense and stressful competition, what with them being long on heart and short on any discernible talent. But what sets Elizabeth Swaney apart from the others is her sheer persistence, having swapped passports more than once and tried multiple sports in her single-minded quest to make it to the Winter Olympics, all the while displaying incredible dedication as well as her ability to employ one of the most American of virtues, that of finding the loophole and figuring out how to game the system.

This particular ruse is multifaceted, which I definitely applaud. Almost every sport in the Olympics has, to some extent, some sort of minimum qualifying standard that you have to meet. The IOC has periodically been willing to relax or ignore competitive standards in the interest of encouraging participation – which is noble, I suppose, right up until you see someone like Eric the Eel attempting to swim, at which point you worry that he might, in fact, drown. (And god bless you, Eric, for giving it a go.) High-level competition can, in fact, be extremely dangerous, particularly in the winter events, and the sight of Eddie the Eagle flinging himself off the ski jumping hills of Calgary long ago gave everyone at the IOC offices in Lausanne a case of the heebie jeebies. So there are some standards here to uphold, although they aren’t as air tight as you might think. In order to qualify for the Winter Olympics in freestyle skiing, you need to earn enough points, which you do through achieving Top 30 finishes in World Cup events. 

Which gets us back to the reason the IOC is trying to increase participation, which is that there aren’t enough competitors in a lot of these sports in a national team-based construct, which restricts the number of team members. You could find 30 Americans, Canadians, and French to fill out the field at freestyle skiing events were these open competitions, but at a good number of events, there simply weren’t enough competitors – meaning that Elizabeth Swaney, our Hungarian hero, was earning points simply for showing up. And like I say, this isn’t just a freestyle skiing issue. For example, when women’s hockey was introduced to the Olympics in 1998, there were basically two good teams, the U.S. and Canada, and 20 years later, there are still basically two good teams. There aren’t enough biathletes, there aren’t enough lugers, nor enough bobsledders in all of the right places.

So Swaney spent several years traveling to competitions across the globe – all of which lacked sufficient numbers of competitors, which enabled her to amass points simply for showing up. She was also able to take advantage of one of the peculiarities of freestyle skiing, in that it’s a judged event in which what constitutes a performance is left entirely up to the interpretation of the judges. Judged sports are, of course, also historically some of the most corrupt, easy to rig through the greasing of palms or the swapping of favors. These sorts of sports have attempted to quantify how they are judged or scored over time, and these systems have their pluses and minuses. Some, like gymnastics and figure skating, have emphasized the importance of risk-taking so much as to create a series of perverse incentives where doing something difficult and doing it badly is better than not doing something difficult at all. (And, naturally, the Russian skater who won gold in PyeongChang did so by gaming the system.) Others take the tact of “whatever you do, do it well.” Freestyle skiing falls into that category. If you fall down, you get severely dinged no matter what it is that you’re trying.

And, as you can see from the .gif that fronts this entry, Swaney took the tack of not doing anything at all, which would actually benefit her in the standings at many events. She couldn’t be graded down for missing a jump, because she didn’t even try one, and doing the bare minimum occasionally resulted in finishing higher than competitors who tried stuff and failed. Taking this tack, of course, makes something of a mockery of the event. Freestyle skiing in a halfpipe is truly one of the most insane sports that I have ever seen. The flips and tricks these athletes pull off as they go flying into the air off the 24’ walls are stunning and absolutely terrifying. The jumps are amazing, the crashes are horrifying. And see, those flips and spins and tricks on skis are the whole bloody point of the event! As much as Eddie the Eagle has been mocked and lampooned in Olympic folklore, the guy was still willing to strap some enormous skis onto his feet and fling himself off the side of the mountain. Almost every sport in the Winter Olympics save for curling seems like it’s designed to kill you.

And you’d think that, in the years’ time she’s been doing this that maybe, maybe, she would, you know, learn how to do the event – but that clearly wasn’t the point. She already has shown enough self-preservation instincts to give up skeleton, properly concluding that hurling oneself head first down a narrow corridor of ice at 80 mph wasn’t a good idea. Swaney has said in interviews that she can, in fact, do some tricks in training, but just hasn’t incorporated them into her halfpipe routine, which is sort of like saying that you should be able to play for the Warriors because you can dunk on the 9’ rim at the middle school around the corner. (Her instructor in Park City was, well, diplomatic when asked about her technical abilities.) Instead, her 1-speed Land Cruiser of a run amid a field of Ferraris stood out like some bizarre alt-theatre piece. What the hell is this? What am I watching?

So to summarize, she spent several years travelling around the world, backed by a federation who’d never seen her ski, getting points for showing up and occasionally getting even more points for doing literally the bare minimum required to garner a score, doing nothing repeatedly in the halfpipes all around the globe in the hopes of eventually doing nothing in the halfpipe in Korea, which is exactly what she wound up doing. 

This is awesome. This is bloody brilliant. Elizabeth Swaney rules. 

Some would argue this makes a mockery of the Winter Olympics, to which I would reply that there isn’t an event on earth more worth mocking. Over the past 24 years, the Winter Olympics has been veering and skidding and hurtling uncontrollably through artificial and unsustainable growth, having been transformed from this fun February diversion taking place in sleepy alpine hamlets into this colossal event costing untold billions to put on. That this has occurred at all owes entirely to one singular event in 1994, which involved the entourage of one American figure skater conspiring, and then attempting, to bludgeon and break the leg of another. That scandal led to must-see viewing and huge ratings, because we all love crime capers and we all love to chase ambulances. Those enormous and record-breaking TV ratings, in turn, led to huge broadcasting rights fees paid by NBC (who, like usual, have completely misread all of the ratings data over that time and concluded that the main reason the ratings are so good is that we Americans actually care about figure skating), which is the basis for everything that the IOC does. Throw in a little bit of bribery here and there, sprinkle in some petrostate billions, season it all with grotesque senses of largesse and self-importance, and this fun, little February diversion has, over decades, grown to ultimately become so expensive, and so unwieldy, that no sane nation on earth wants to host it any more. I said previously that I felt like these Olympics were going to be something of a dud, a low-watt endeavour lacking starpower which was struggling to find ways to remain relevant. One thing that I noticed across Olympic disciplines this year was this attempt to invent new variations in order to generate interest – team events, new sorts of relays and the like, many of which the best athletes found pointless and skipped altogether. All of it felt forced and artificial. The event never really took off for me this year. It sort of slogged on and petered out for me. It was little more than a good way to kill some time during the weeklong NBA All-Star break, instead of doing much to stand out on its own.

And I say that as someone who has always loved the Olympics, because I love seeing people do incredible things on the grandest of stages. Seeing Elizabeth Swaney go meandering down the halfpipe does, in fact, destroy any sort of ideal that I have about the athletes. I mean, back when I had two functioning feet and I lived in Colorado, I would ski every day. I got to be a very competent skier, a skier who would probably have been better able to execute a freestyle ski routine than Swaney – and that’s not tooting my own horn, either, because no one of my level of skiing ever has any business ever being in the Olympics ever! 

But at the same time, this is one helluva hustle she pulled off. We like the Olympics, of course, precisely because cool athletes do cool things, and she wanted to be a part of that one way or another. And something more that I would say about our beloved Eddie the Eagle is that, when you think about it, save for Katarina Witt and possibly the dueling Brians, Eddie the Eagle is the single-most memorable character from the Calgary Olympics of 1988. Quick, who won the Men’s Alpine Combined in Calgary? Who won the biathlon relay? How many medals did the U.S. win? And no looking it up! You put that internet down right now! … oh wait, that means I don’t have any readers … 

The point is that these narratives fade and are soon forgotten. Part of why you see so many older athletes in the Winter Olympics is that they cling to this moment. It’s why you see 46-year-old speed skaters and 45-year-old ski jumpers. This 2-week period is their one chance to make even the slightest of marks and they yearn for that opportunity. American skier Mikaela Shiffrin, who won two medals in Korea yet somehow wound up being construed as a failure given what was expected of her, spoke of the intense sort of emptiness that these athletes feel once the Olympics are over. Many of them suffer through bouts of severe depression, wondering just what the hell it is that they are doing with their lives and questioning why it is that they keep breaking their bodies as they toil in obscurity. I’ll applaud anyone who finds the will to keeping doing this stuff in order to make it back to the Olympics, even if they have to cheat and game the system in order to do it.

The Lose awards the gold medal of these Olympics to Ester Ledecká, the gold-medal winning Czech snowboarder who also, for the hell of it, went over to run with the 2-plankers, used a pair of borrowed skis and won the women’s Giant Slalom. This reaction is priceless, as she could not believe she won. She just might be the coolest person in the universe:


The silver medal goes to “Team Reject,” the U.S. curling team, four guys who were basically told “you suck, now go away,” by the U.S. federation after the last Olympics but refused to do so, winning a gold medal and making curling cool in the process. Seriously, we need a rags-to-riches curling movie made, possibly directed by Christopher Guest. (The fact a Russian curler was caught doping makes all of this even more ridiculous. Why are you doping in curling? Just drink more beer!) This was some fun and fabulous stuff from Team Reject. I don’t know anything about curling, but I knew this shot was cool when I saw it:


The bronze medal goes to the U.S. women’s hockey team for finally beating those dirty, nasty, evil Canadians in the Olympics after 20 years of trying. This winning goal by Jocelyne Lamoureux in the shootout is filth. Pure filth. It was an incredible game. and, in the process of finally exorcising their Canadian dæmons, the U.S. women’s hockey team have now also carried on that time-honored Olympic tradition of reminding people in this country what a great sport hockey is, which will then be followed by a great number of enthusiastic, hopeful budding hockey fans tuning into NHL games and wondering why the product seems so bad: 


We have to give a shout-out to U.S. Speed Skating, who continue to be terrible and continue to be poorly attired. They win our Worst Dressed award for these Olympics. (French ice dancer Gabriella Papadakis wins our Least Dressed award). You may recall this imbroglio from four years ago about the high-tech suits Under Armour designed which they never properly tested. Well, Under Armour was back again in 2018 with this bizarre design highlighting skater’s privates which, well, make you wonder what the hell anyone involved in this process was thinking. Oh, everyone involved gave some reason why this special design would improve performance and such, but did you, you know, ever stop and look at them?


But Elizabeth Swaney wins the entire Olympics. She wins the whole thing. I award her one Olympics for her tenacity, naïveté, and for bringing some absurdity to a bloated event badly in need of it. She wins all the things. She is the true Lose Olympic hero.

Go big, Lizzie. Go big!

Do you have any questions you’d like to ask? Would you like to commiserate because your team sucks? Drop me a line! You can email me atinplaylose@gmail.com, and when we get enough questions and comments gathered up, I’ll do another Hate Mail edition of In Play Lose.